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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 930160-CA

:

SONJA LE SWANSON,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction by guilty plea of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 1993), in the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Attorney/Firm Relationship.

Did the district court

err in determining that the prosecutorial and governmental
functions perfoirmed by members of the firm of Gallian, Westfall &
Wilcox did not embroil defendant's appointed counsel in a conflict of interest under State v. Brown?
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it will review a
trial court's "determination of whether a given set of facts
comes within the reach of a given rule of law" for correctness,

according the trial court "a measure of discretion" or "some
discretion"; however, "precisely how much discretion we cannot
say."

State v. Pena. No. 930101, slip op. at 5, 10, 11 n.6 (Utah

Feb. 15, 1994).
2.

Ineffective Assistance,

Was defendant's appointed

counsel otherwise ineffective under the sixth amendment?
[Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present a mixed question of fact and law.
Therefore, in a situation where a trial court
has previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing
courts are free to make an independent determination of a trial court's conclusions. The
factual findings of the trial court, however,
shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)).
3.

Attorney's Pees.

Should this Court award attor-

ney's fees to defendant for private, non-appointed counsel under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 (Supp. 1993)?
This issue does not require this Court to review any
ruling of the district court.
4.

General Order.

Does this Court have jurisdiction

to promulgate a general order governing attorney conflicts of
interest?
This issue does not require this Court to review any
ruling of the district court.
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5,

Dismissal of Charges.

If this Court finds that

defendant's representation did not comport with applicable law,
should all charges against defendant be dismissed with prejudice?
This issue does not require this Court to review any
ruling of the district court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on
request of defendant or order of court.
(1) Counsel shall be assigned to represent each
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged with
a crime in which there is a substantial probability
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either
jail or prison if:
(a) the defendant requests it; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise so
orders and the defendant does not affirmatively waive
or reject on the record the opportunity to be represented.
(2) (a) If the county, city, or town responsible
to provide for the legal defense of an indigent defendant has arranged by contract to provide those services
and the court has received notice or a copy of such
contract, the court shall appoint the contracting
attorney as legal counsel to represent that defendant.
(b) The court shall select and appoint the attorney or attorneys if:
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is
with multiple attorneys; or
(ii) the contract is with an additional attorney or attorneys in the event of a conflict of interest.
(c) If the court considers the appointment of a
noncontracting attorney to provide legal services to an
indigent defendant despite the existence of an indigent
legal services contract and the court has a copy or
notice of such contract, before the court may make the
appointment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice to the attorney of the
responsible county, city, or town of the hearing; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling
reason to appoint a noncontracting attorney.
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(d) The indigent defendant's mere preference for
other counsel shall not be considered a compelling
reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting
attorney.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel Compensation•
(1) When representing an indigent person the
assigned counsel shall:
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the
proceeding following assignment; and
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other
remedies before or after conviction that he considers
to be in the interest of justice except for other and
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ
proceedings.
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or
power under this section to represent an indigent
defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a
discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first
appeal of right to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in
the context of the appellate process of this state.
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant
shall be entitled to compensation upon the approval of
the district court where the original trial was held,
upon a showing that the defendant has been denied a
constitutional right or that there was newly discovered
evidence that would show the defendant's innocence and
that the legal services rendered by counsel were other
than that required under this act or under a separate
fee arrangement and were necessary for the indigent
defendant and not for the purpose of delaying the
judgment of the original" trier of fact.
Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.10(a).
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information as follows:
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Count I

Possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (Cum, Supp.
1993)

Count II

Possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990)

(R. 2). On January 14, 1993, at a "felony arraignment," the
district court questioned defendant as to her assets and appointed public defender J. MacArthur Wright as her counsel (R. 3,
105).

Defendant pled guilty to count I, and the court dismissed

count II (R. 15-16) .
Defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years and a fine of
$10,000 (R. 52). Execution of the sentence was stayed and
defendant was placed on 36-month probation and ordered to serve
60 days in the Washington County Jail, 30 days of which were
stayed upon condition that defendant obtain substance abuse
counseling (R. 53). Defendant appeals from this judgment (R. 6971) .
On March 4, 1993, R'. Clayton Huntsman entered his
appearance as defendant's counsel and filed a notice of appeal
and a petition for a certificate of probable cause (R. 21-29).
On March 10, 1993, defendant moved for an order finding
her indigent and requiring the county to pay for her transcript
and other costs (R. 48-50).

On March 12, 1993, defendant filed a

motion for costs and attorney's fees, alleging bad faith on the
part of the Washington County Attorney's Office (R. 56-59).
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The

same day, after a hearing, the district court found defendant to
be indigent and ordered Washington County to pay for a transcript
of all proceedings on her case, "as well as costs of the first
right of appeal, including appeal of the Certificate of Probable
Cause if necessary" (R. 63-64, 66). However, the court denied
defendant's request for attorney's fees on the ground that the
court found no bad faith on the part of the State (R. 66, 86-87).
Near the end of the hearing on the certificate of
probable cause, the prosecution made two offers on the record.
Notwithstanding its belief that defendant was "treated fairly and
provided with very competent and effective counsel," the State
stipulated that defendant could withdraw her guilty plea "and the
Court could reset the case for a jury trial and let justice
prevail."

In the alternative, the State stipulated "that a

Certificate of Probable Cause should issue in this case" (R.
293).

Defendant responded to neither of these offers.
On March 17, 1993, after a hearing, the district court

granted the certificate of probable cause (R. 67-68).

The court

drafted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 9198, addendum E ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After she was sentenced, defendant asked Clayton
Huntsman, her present counsel, to assist her (R. 33). He filed a
notice of appeal and represented her at the hearing on her
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petition for a certificate of probable cause.

The following

facts were adduced at the hearing on the petition.
Mr. Wright is one of two Washington County public
defenders.

He handles half of all non-capital criminal cases and

all the capital cases (R. 224-25, 262).
After Mr. Wright had been appointed, defendant contacted him by calling the number listed in the telephone directory
for the firm of Gallian & Westfall (R. 158). She was familiar
with the firm because she had hired John Hummel of the firm to
represent her in a custody dispute involving her daughter (R.
239) .
Mr. Wright appears in a photograph of the members of
Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox published in a display ad in a local
telephone directory (Exhibit D-l, page 19; R. 185; addendum A ) .
Defendant had seen this photograph of the law firm or another
like it before she entered her guilty plea (R. 245-460).
In that directory, Mr. Wright is listed as a member of
the firm without additional designation, although he had intended
for his name to be listed as "of counsel" and the printers were
told to list it that way (Exhibit D-l, page 18; R. 185, 270;
addendum B) . In a telephone directory issued by another publisher, Mr. Wright is listed as "of counsel" (Ex. D-3, R. 187,
addendum C) . Mr. Wright's name appears on the firm letterhead,
designated as "of counsel" (Ex. P-2, R. 183, addendum D).
firm pays for the letterhead (R. 274).
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The

When asked to define the term "of counsel," Mr. Wright
testified, "I don't define it.

I can tell you what our relation-

ship is, if that's what you want" (R. 180). Defendant testified
that she did not know what "of counsel" meant (R. 250) . Russell
Gallian testified that he did not think there was a legal definition of the term, that it "describes a relationship that is not
an employee and not a partner," that its meaning "varies quite a
bit depending upon the specific relationship," and that he had
always thought of it as like an office sharing arrangement, at
least economically (R. 258-59, 267). Mr. Wright does not associate with the firm on any case (R. 260).
The firm name, "Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox," appears on
the law firm's office door (R. 158-59).

Mr. Wright's name does

not (R. 186) . If a client came to the office looking for Mr.
Wright, he or she would have to go through the firm's offices in
order to find Mr. Wright (R. 187). As of December 1992, Mr.
Wright's office was moved down the hall "to try and create a
little more separation" (R. 269).
Mr. Wright pays a specific flat amount of rent plus "a
percentage of his civil cases" to the firm each month (R. 180,
254) . He also shares secretary, receptionist, word processing,
and telephone services (R. 180-81).

Mr. Wright's secretary uses

her word processor for all the attorneys she works for, including
other members of the firm (R. 182). Mr. Wright testified that
his secretary does not discuss his cases with anybody else, nor
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anyone else's cases with him (R. 189). Nor does he have any
knowledge about the cases the firm prosecutes in the town of
Ivins (R. 190).
Mr. Wright testified that he would not go on the
opposite side of a case that the Gallian firm was handling, in
part because "I wouldn't want to appear that there was any
problem" (R. 190). He further testified, "If Miss Swanson
obviously had been sued by Gallian & Westfall or was a client of
Gallian & Westfall, I'd say that I certainly would not have been
able to have represented her.

But she was not" (R. 199).

Mr. Gallian is the senior partner in the law firm of
Gallian & Westfall, also known as Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox (R.
180, 253) . Mr. Gallian and his firm are the town attorneys for
the town of Ivins (R. 143-44, 254) .* John Hummel of that firm
appeared as a prosecutor in the justice court in Ivins (R.
145) .2
As town attorney, Mr. Gallian's job description includes advising the town with regard to police policies or
practices and giving legal opinions to police officers (R. 27576).

The town of Ivins contracts with two Washington County

1

The firm discontinued its prosecutorial function the evening
prior to the hearing (R. 311). At that time, Mr. Wright's
representation of defendant had been completed.
2

John Hummel also serves as the public defender for the City
of Kanab (R. 311).
9

sheriffs to serve as town police officers (R. 277). However, Mr,
Gallian is not involved in any prosecutorial decisions (R. 278).
Mr. Gallian also serves as a Washington County commissioner (R. 253). He supervises the county attorney's office, the
jail, the sheriff's department, and other law enforcement, and is
involved in issues such as salaries, hiring, firing, retention,
and promotions.

However, he is not involved in day-to-day law

enforcement activities (R. 264). Mr. Gallian has never voted on
Mr. Wright's contract with the county, and testified that if it
comes to a vote, he'll abstain (R. 256).
Since becoming public defender, Mr. Wright has not
prosecuted a case in Washington County or in the town of Ivins
(R. 201, 255).
Steve Trost, Utah Bar counsel, testified as an expert
on matters of attorney ethics (R. 296). He testified that
although "of counsel" is an amorphous term, it indicates an
association closer to a partnership than to an office-sharing
arrangement (R. 3 01-02) .
Mr. Trost also gave his expert opinion that it was
unethical for Mr. Wright to act as public defender in light of
his arrangement with Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox (R. 304).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

In the trial court, the State stipulated to the

withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea.

In the same spirit, the

State on appeal concedes reversible error in this case. Defen-
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dant's appointed defense counsel had a close of counsel
ship with the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox.

relation-

Members of

that firm acted as prosecutors and police advisors in the town of
Ivins and served on the Washington County Commission.

Although

State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), does not address the
question of imputation of conflicts, on the facts of this case,
the appointment of defendant's counsel violated the principle of
that case.

Consequently, this case should be remanded to permit

defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and for appointment of
conflict-free counsel.
2.

In view of the State's concession of reversible

error under Brown, this Court need not reach the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel.
3.

This Court should not award attorney's fees to

defendant's present appellate counsel.
raised for the first time on appeal.

First, this claim is

Second, present defense

counsel never sought nor received an appointment, but appeared at
defendant's request in a private capacity.

He has at no time

complied with the statutory procedure for appointment and compensation of indigent's counsel.

Moreover, it would be inequitable

to charge the public with funding an appeal for the purpose of
achieving relief to which the State stipulated in the trial
court.
amicus

Finally, defendant's request for attorney's fees for
is unsupported by any authority and so must fail.
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4.

Defendant asks this Court to promulgate a general

order governing appointed defense counsel s conflicts of interest.

This Court lacks the authority to enter such an order.

Furthermore, defendant has not complied with the procedure
established by the Utah Supreme Court for adopting general
ethical rules.
5.

Defendant seeks dismissal of all charges against

her with prejudice.

This claim was not preserved below and is

unsupported by any authority.

It must accordingly be denied.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPOINTED COUNSEL'S ASSOCIATION WITH A FIRM
WHOSE MEMBERS PROSECUTED AND SUPERVISED
PROSECUTORS AND POLICE CREATED A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST UNDER STATE V. BROWN AND REQUIRES
VACATION OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
In the trial court, the State offered to stipulate that
defendant could withdraw her guilty plea and go to trial.
the conclusion of the evidence, the prosecutor stated:
MR. LUDLOW: I've got a proposal to Miss
Swanson, Your Honor. If the defendant agrees
to withdraw her appeal, the State will stipulate that she can withdraw her guilty plea,
and the Court could reset the case for a jury
trial and let justice prevail. If the defendant fees like she's [been] cheated out of a
jury trial, or if she feels like some injustice was committed. Although the State believes she was treated fairly and provided
with very competent and effective counsel.
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Before

(R. 293) .3 Neither defendant nor the court even responded to
this offer (see R. 293-94).

The State now concedes that the

public defender's conflict of interest requires vacation of
defendant's guilty plea, the same remedy it offered to stipulate
to below.

This point will set forth the State's rationale for

this conclusion.
A.

The District Court Erred In Finding that the Relationship Between Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and
Defense Counsel Was One of Landlord/Tenant.

The trial court found that the relationship between the
law firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and the public defender J.
MacArthur Wright is one of landlord/tenant (R. 93, addendum E ) .
Defendant and amicus

curiae

contest this finding (Brief of

Appellant [hereinafter Br. App.] 33; Brief of Amicus

Curiae

[hereinafter Br. Am. 9 n.l).
Two possible standards of review apply.

This issue

might be seen as entailing review of an "historical" fact under
the clearly erroneous standard.

[cite].

Or it might be seen as

entailing review of a "determination of whether a given set of
facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law," reviewable
under the sliding scale of State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip op. at
5, 10, 11 n.6 (Utah Feb. 15, 1994).

This Court need not resolve

which standard applies, as the State concedes that the finding is
clearly erroneous, thereby satisfying both standards.

3

The prosecution stipulated in the alternative to issuance
of the certificate of probable cause (R. 293).
13

Findings are clearly erroneous only if they "are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made."

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1987).
Here, all the evidence presented in the trial court
tended to show that Mr. Wright's practice was intertwined with
that of the Gallian firm and that he was on "of counsel" status
with the firm.

There was no testimony that anyone viewed his

relationship with the firm as merely one of landlord/tenant.
The Utah Bar counsel gave his uncontradicted expert
opinion that although of counsel

is an amorphous term, it indi-

cates an association closer to a partnership than to an officesharing arrangement.

A formal ABA ethics opinion defines the

"core characteristic" properly denoted by the term of counsel

as

a "close, regular, personal relationship";
but a relationship which is neither that of a
partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a
professional corporation), with the shared
liability and/or managerial responsibility
implied by that term; nor, on the other hand,
the status ordinarily conveyed by the term
"associate," which is to say a junior nonpartner lawyer, regularly employed by the
firm.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 90-357 (1990).
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B.

On the Facts of This Case, Gallian's Conflict of
Interest Must Be Imputed to Wright.

In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court announced a per se rule of reversal whenever a city
attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities is appointed to
represent an indigent defendant.

Id. at 857, 859. While citing

the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, the
court stated that it was acting pursuant to its "inherent supervisory power over the courts" as well as its "express power to
govern the practice of law."

Id. at 857.

This rule would clearly prohibit attorney Gallian from
serving as a public defender.
no prosecutorial functions.
that on the facts

of this

However, attorney Wright performs

Nevertheless, the State believes

particular

case,

the conflict of

interest must be imputed to Mr. Wright.
Rule 1.10(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
states: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c),
1.9 or 2.2."

There seems no good reason not to extend the reach

of this rule to attorneys who are of counsel

to a firm.

The

American Bar Association has opined, "There can be no doubt that
an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is 'associated in' and has an
'association with' the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of
counsel, for purposes of . . . the general imputation of disqualification pursuant to Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules . . . "
15

ABA

Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 90-357 (1990).
Moreover, the Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah
State Bar has recently published its Opinion No. 126.

It reads

in part: "A city attorney with prosecutorial functions may not
represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction. . . . An
attorney who is a partner or associate of a city attorney may not
represent a criminal defense client in any situation where the
city attorney is so prohibited."

Utah State

Approves

Comment Period,

Ethics

Opinions

& 60-Day

Bar

Commission
Utah Bar

Journal, March 1994, at 23. This opinion forbids an attorney
associated with a city attorney who performs prosecutorial functions to represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction.
Bar opinions do not bind courts or even practitioners, but they
do bind bar disciplinary counsel and are entitled to some measure
of consideration by this Court.
On the facts of this case, where the firm and the
involved communities are small, the public defender is closely
identified with the firm in public advertisements, and the
strands of potential conflict are many, the State concedes that
Mr. Wright's representation of defendant as appointed counsel ran
afoul of Brown.

Accordingly, even without a "concrete showing of

prejudice,fl the appropriate remedy is reversal of the conviction
and remand for a new trial, or in this instance, a new plea.
Brown, 853 P.2d at 859, 861.
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POINT II
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
CHALLENGE
Defendant also claims that she was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment (Br. App. 35) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1983)).

In view of the State's confession of revers-

ible error on the issue of dual representation, this Court need
not reach the question of ineffective assistance.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT AWARD DEFENDANT
ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-322 FOR PRIVATE, NON-APPOINTED COUNSEL
In the trial court, defendant moved for an award of
attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) on the
ground that the State had acted in bad faith.

Although defendant

informs the Court that she sought fees under this statute below,
she has apparently abandoned this argument on appeal (Br. 38).
The State will therefore not address it.4

4

Section 78-27-56 is mentioned once in the brief, although
it is misidentified. This is the reference:
Present counsel requested attorneys fees already
from the District Court, and same was denied. See
Addendum, App. 3, "Order Denying Attorneys Fees".
U.C.A. § 77-27-56 [sic] authorizes attorneys fees
in civil cases, and UrCivP [sic] 81(e) authorizes
application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to
criminal cases.
So far as section 78-27-56 is concerned, the brief contains no further
analysis or argument, nor does it include citations to any authorities
17

Defendant argues that this Court should appoint
defendant's appellate counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 and
should, pursuant to that statute, award attorney's fees for
"challenging an unjust conviction,"5 obtaining a certificate of
probable cause, and bringing the appeal (Br. App. 38).
Defendant asserts this claim for the first time on
appeal.

In the probable cause hearing, the court asked present

defense counsel, "With respect to the motion for attorney's fees,
what is your legal basis for that, Mr. Huntsman?"

Counsel

responded that he relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and that
he reserved any common law theories such as quantum meruit.

He

did not mention section 77-32-2 (see R. 288).
"As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many
times, [they] generally will not consider an issue, even a
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the
first time."

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990).

Similarly, where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground
for relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not
consider that ground on appeal.

Id. (citing State v. Carter, 707

or parts of the record relied on as required by rule 24 (a) (9) , Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The State therefore concludes that
this section has been abandoned as a ground for defendant's claim
on appeal for attorney's fees.
5

It is unclear what this phrase refers to if not the certificate
of probable cause and the appeal. Defendant did not move to withdraw
her guilty plea in the trial court.
18

P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)).

Accordingly, this Court should not

consider defendant's attorney's fee claim on appeal.
Insofar as defendant's claim may be read as a motion
for attorney's fees on appeal directed to this Court in the first
instance (see Br. App. at 38-39), it is misdirected.
Section 77-32-2(2) (c) sets out a procedure to be
followed in appointing a non-contracting attorney in a county,
like Washington County, which has contracted for indigent legal
services.

Where the county has contracted with conflicts

counsel, they are to be appointed.

§ 77-32-2(2) (b).

Washington

County has contracted with Douglas Terry to handle cases in which
MacArthur Wright has a conflict (R. 224-25).

Defendant has never

intimated that Mr. Terry was prevented from representing her by a
conflict of interest.
In the event that no contracting attorney is able to
represent an indigent defendant, the statute provides for
appointing a non-contracting attorney.

It requires (a) a

hearing; (b) notice to the county attorney; and (c) "findings
that there is a compelling reasons to appoint a noncontracting
attorney."

Id.

In this case, defendant and her present counsel

made no effort to comply with these requirements.
Present defense counsel never sought appointment and
was never appointed by the district court to represent defendant.
On the contrary, he appeared as private counsel and at

19

defendant's request (R. 33). After the court granted defendant's
motion for paid transcripts, it queried Mr. Huntsman as follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Huntsman, let's [sic] me
ask you just as an officer of the court, are
you appearing in this matter as retained
counsel or as pro bono counsel?
MR. HUNTSMAN: Neither one, Your Honor.
I've been paid nothing, I have accepted
nothing, I've been offered nothing. But I
don't want to waive any right to recover
anything under the appropriate circumstances.
THE COURT: All right. And I appreciate
that record. I think that makes your
circumstance clear.
(R. 288-89) . What was clear was that Mr. Huntsman made no claim
to having been appointed.

Amicus

aptly observes that Mr.

Huntsman merely "assumed Swanson's defense" (Br. Am. at 16).
Furthermore, an assigned counsel is entitled to
compensation only "upon the approval of the district court where
the original trial was held."
(1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3(3)

Mr. Huntsman never sought or received this approval.
Neither defendant nor amicus

cites any authority, and

the State is aware of none, that would permit an unappointed
"white knight" to ignore the statutory scheme, assume the defense
of an indigent despite the availability of contract conflicts
counsel, do nothing to dispel the court's impression that he was
privately arranged, and then petition the appellate court for
fees incurred at both trial and appellate levels.
This would be a different case had the trial court
improperly refused to appoint conflicts counsel in the face of
20

defendant's colorable claim of conflict of interest.

In that

case, defendant might be entitled to the fees wrongly denied in
the trial court and those generated in correcting the trial
court's error.

But here the trial court was not presented with

and therefore did not deny any request for fees under section 7732-2.6
Moreover, the State assails the basic fairness in
granting this defendant's attorney's fees on this appeal. The
only claim raised by defendant that is "warranted by existing
law" or "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law," Utah R. App. P. 33(b), is her Brown claim.
The remedy for a Brown violation is reversal of the conviction
and remand for a new trial, or in this instance, a new plea.
Brown, 853 P.2d at 859, 861. But the State stipulated to
withdrawal of the guilty plea in the trial court (see R. 293).
It seems inequitable to charge the county with funding an appeal
for the purpose of achieving relief to which the prosecution
stipulated in the trial court.
Finally, neither defendant nor amicus

cites any author-

ity, and the State is aware of none, supporting an award of
attorney's fees for amicus

(see Br. App. at 45). Accordingly,

this Court "must disregard this issue."

6

State v. Wareham. 772

In view of the trial court's issuance of a certificate of
probable cause, it seems likely that it would have granted a defense
motion for appointment of appellate conflicts counsel to litigate
the conflict-of-interest issue.
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P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App.
1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); Utah
R. App. P. 24(d) (9) .
POINT IV
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE A
GENERAL ORDER GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST, NOR IS ONE NECESSARY
Defendant asks this Court to promulgate a "bright line"
rule forbidding government attorneys and their associates to
represent criminal defendants, whether retained or appointed (Br.
App. 41-42).
As defendant herself apparently recognizes, the jurisdiction to promulgate such a general order is vested exclusively
in the Supreme Court.7 Article VIII section 4 of the Utah
Constitution provides:

"The Supreme Court by rule shall govern

the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law."

The

court of appeals accordingly lacks jurisdiction to enter the
general order that defendant seeks.
Moreover, there is a procedure by which general rules
of professional conduct are adopted and promulgated by the
Supreme Court.

See Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-101 ("Supreme

Court rule on rulemaking process").

7

The procedure is not

for the

His brief requests that the scope of Brown be expanded "by
Supreme Court Order" (Br. App. 41).
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court of appeals to announce such rules in judicial opinions
resolving particular disputes.
Finally, defendant should take some solace in Opinion
No. 126 of the Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah
State Bar (addendum F).

This opinion, published after the filing

of defendant's brief, brands as unethical much of the conduct
defendant seeks to prohibit.

While a Bar opinion is not binding

upon practitioners and the courts, it serves notice that the
Office of Attorney Discipline will investigate practitioners
engaging in forbidden conduct.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT THIS COURT DISMISS
THE CHARGES AGAINST HER WITH PREJUDICE WAS
NOT PRESERVED BELOW AND IS LEGALLY
INSUPPORTABLE
Defendant asserts that she "has already suffered
enough"; that she was "railroaded through a system unwilling to
provide her with even the most rudimentary due process, and
harassed by a hostile district court judge"; that the "voyeuristic arresting officers . . . did wilfully and contemptuously rape
due process and rendered cruel and unusual punishment to one
assumed to be innocent" (Br. App. 43). She further asserts that,
as a victim of "Dixie justice," her "only meaningful remedy . . .
is dismissal here and now of all her charges, with prejudice and
on the merits" (Br, App. 43).
However, defendant filed no motion to dismiss below, on
these or any other grounds.

"A matter is sufficiently raised
23

only if it has been submitted to the trial court and the trial
court has had an opportunity to rule on the question."
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 n.5 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.
Where,

as here, "the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on the
question presented on appeal," this Court "will not address the
question for the first time on appeal."

Id.

Moreover, defendant cites no authority, and the State
is aware of none, indicating that dismissal of charges with
prejudice is an appropriate remedy for any of defendant's alleged
wrongs or where Brown has been violated or defense counsel found
ineffective.

For this reason alone this Court "must disregard

this issue."

Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966; Amicone, 689 P.2d at

1344; Reiner, 803 P.2d at 1301 n.2; Webb, 790 P.2d at 71 n.2;
Utah R. App. P. 24(d)(9).
CONCLUSION
Based on the record on appeal and the applicable law,
the State respectfully requests that this Court vacate defendant's guilty plea and remand this case for appointment of
conflict-free counsel and re-prosecution.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Marrty^ \, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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ADDENDUM E

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]i FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
)
OF LAW REGARDING THE HEARING
]> OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
>
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

SONJA LE SWANSON,
i
Defendant.

Case No. 931500042

]

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for a
Certificate of Probable Cause. A hearing was held on March 5, 1993, and continued on
for further proceedings on March 8, 1993, and March 12, 1993. The Defendant was
represented by Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman and was present at all the hearings. The State
of Utah was represented by Mr. Wade Faraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney on
March 5,1993, and by Mr. Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, on March 8th and
12th, 1993. The Court heard the evidence offered by the parties and reviewed the file and
legal authorities submitted by the parties. The State of Utah took the position that the
Certificate of Probable Cause should be entered at the conclusion of the hearing.
However, the Court made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the bench
regarding the relationship between Mr. I. MacArthur Wright, this Defendant's former
counsel, and the law firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox. The Court instructed Mr.
Huntsman to prepare written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accord with the
Court's ruling from the bench. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were

rnosi

submitted by Mr. Huntsman, but they did not conform with the Court's ruling. After
instructing Mr. Huntsman to obtain a copy of the Court's tape recorded ruling to assist in
the accurate preparation of the written document, the Court received another proposed
pleading that was not complete or in accord with the Court's ruling.
Therefore, the Court obtained the official transcript of the proceedings of March
12, 1993, and from tint source has prepared the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Court specifically finds that on January the 13th, 1993, this defendant,
Sonja Le Swanson, was arrested in her own home during a circumstance in which officers
were executing a search warrant for controlled substances, and, in fact, discovered the
controlled substance methamphetamine within her home. She was arrested and charged
with the second-degree felony offense which is set forth in the Information in the file,
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
2. The Court further finds that on the 14th day of January, 1993, Miss Swanson
appeared personally before this judge, and at that time, I placed her under oath and
questioned her with respect to her financial means to determine whether or not she should
be appointed counsel. The Court determined at that time Ms. Swanson was indigent. The
Court then appointed Mr. J. MacArthur Wright to represent the Ms. Swanson.
3. The Court finds that in the month of January, 1993, Mr. J. MacArthur Wright
was serving as lead defense counsel for the public defender functions in Washington
County. Mr. Wright and Mr. Douglas Terry alternate months during the 1993 calendar

year under their current contract with Washington County, as they had throughout the year
1992.
4.

The Court specifically finds, from the bind-over order executed by

Commissioner Lema, that the preliminary hearing was waived by this defendant pursuant
to a plea agreement, and that the defendant was released from custody. The Court finds
that the release from custody was foremost in the defendant's mind in reaching the plea
agreement and entering the plea.
5. The Court finds that on March the 3rd of 1993, the defendant appeared before
this court, for sentencing, and the Court executed the judgment, sentence, stay of
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment on March the 5th, two days
later. As a condition of probation, the defendant was ordered to serve 60 days in the
Washington County Jail, 30 days to be stayed upon the obtaining of substance abuse
counseling.
6. With respect to the relationship between this defendant and the law
firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and the public defender Mr. J. MacArthur Wright, the
Court makes the finding that the relationship between Mr. Wright and the firm is one of
landlord/tenant.

The Court does not find that the description "office-sharing" is

appropriate under these circumstances.
7. The Court specifically finds that in the relationship of
landlord/tenant between Mr. Wright and the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox, Mr.
Wright pays rent of $1,200 a month plus a percentage of the fees generated in civil cases.
By "civil cases," the Court includes any civil litigation, contracts that might be drafted,
adoptions, domestic relations, anything that is not related to criminal defense as appointed

counsel, in the way of the practice of law. The Court likens that relationship to any other
commercial relationship where a base rent is established, and additional rent, based upon
revenues of the commercial establishment, is due under the terms of the rental agreement.
8. In exchange for the rent paid, Mr. Wright receives office and associated space,
access to the telephone which is the same telephone number as the firm, Gallian, Westfall
& Wilcox as shown on the letterhead, Exhibit 2. Mr. Wright also receives receptionist
and secretarial services.
9.

The Court specifically finds that there is no evidence before the Court to

persuade the Court that any prosecutorial function occurred out of the office of Gallian,
Westfall & Wilcox during the period of time from January the 14th, 1993, until today's
date.
10. The Court further finds that the prosecutorial relationship between the firm of
Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox with the town of Ivins was terminated on the 11th day of
March, 1993, at a town council meeting in the town of Ivins.
11. Prior to that time, the Court finds that the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox
served as legal counsel to the Town of Ivins for both civil concerns as well as
prosecutorial functions in cases involving the violation of town ordinances. The Court
finds that as of the 11th of March, 1993, that no longer is the case, based upon the
testimony of Mr. Gallian, the town attorney.
12. The Court further finds that there is no direct evidence of any conflict of
interest between Mr. Wright in his representation of this defendant and the operation of
the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox as the town attorney for the Town of Ivins.
13. The Court finds that there has been, throughout all of this relationship, a clear

and convincing effort on the part of Mr. J. MacArthur Wright and the firm of Gallian,
Westfall & Wilcox to maintain the highest ethical standards not only required by the Code,
but implied through the Code.
14.

The Court specifically finds that the advertisement in Exhibit No. 1 is a

scrivener's error, having omitted the term " of counsel" for Mr. J. MacArthur Wright and
his son Jonathan Wright.
15. The Court finds that the "of counsel" designation has no definition in the
statutes or the case law of the State of Utah, and the Court places no reliance on the use
of that term.
16. The Court further finds that this defendant, Sonja Le Swanson, in a civil
matter unrelated to this case, had retained as her counsel Mr. John £. Hummel, an
associate of the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox, as her own counsel in a domestic
matter which apparently is concluded. While that attorney /client relationship is not seen
by this court as any waiver, it is a unique fact circumstance which is found by the Court.
17. The Court specifically finds that as of January 1st of 1993, Mr. Gallian is now
serving as a Washington County commissioner.

That among Mr. Gallian's executive

functions as a Washington County commissioner is the budgetary supervision of the
county attorney's office.
18. The Court specifically finds that Mr. Gallian's supervision is only budgetary,
and that his elective

position in no way impacts the prosecutorial decisions of the

Washington County Attorney's office.
19. With respect to Ms. Swanson's representation by Mr. J. MacArthur Wright,
the Court has already found that Ms. Swanson knowingly and voluntarily entered her plea.

The Court finds that she was represented by capable, competent counsel with many years'
experience before the criminal bar. After review of the facts of this case as stated by Mr.
Wright, after the waiver of client confidences, the Court finds that this Defendant was ably
represented in the negotiation of this plea agreement.
20. The Court finds that this defendant knowingly and intentionally and voluntarily
entered her plea of guilty on the 20th day of January, 1993. The Court conducted a
careful Rule 11 colloquy with this defendant to make sure that she understood the rights
that she would be giving up, the opportunities that she would have at trial, and the Court
found then and finds now that Ms. Swanson appears to be operating under no duress, no
threat or coercion, and frankly does not appear to this Court to be so naive as her
Affidavit might set her out to be.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The clear mandate set forth in the recent Utah. Supreme Court case of State v.
Brown. 201 Utah Adv. Rep 4, handed down on November 30, 1992, is quoted for
reference:
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to appoint a
city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we
conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city
prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an accused. Consequently, we hold
that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over
the courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to
defend indigent persons; therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and order a new
trial.

2. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys states, in pertinent
part:
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by
Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially factually related matter in which that
lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer has associated, had previously represented a
client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer
had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the
matter.
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to
those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client
under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

3. The current version of Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing the
application determines that there are meritorious issues that should be decided by
the appellate court.

4. In balancing the mandate in State v. Brown, supra., with the facts as found
in this case, the Court determines that there is a meritorious issue to be decided by the
Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore, a Certificate of Probable Cause will issue.

5. Counsel for the Defendant should prepare the Certificate of Probable Cause
and submit it to the Court for signature and entry.

3 1 ^
DATED this 30th day of March, 1993

MAILING CERTIFICATE
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following counsel this [&+. day of
(jL^tv'.y
1993, by first class mail, postage pre-paid:
Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman
2 West St. George Boulevard, No. 31
St. George, Utah 84770
Mr. Eric Ludlow
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
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ADDENDUM F

Utah State Bar
Commission
Approves Ethics
Opinions & 60-Day
Comment Period
The Board of Bar Commissioners has
adopted a policy whereby ethics opinions
will be approved, pursuant to the recommendations of the Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee, pending a 60-day
comment period following publication in
the Bar Journal.
Opinion No. 126
Approved January 27,1994
Issue: Under what circumstances may a
city attorney represent criminal defendants?
Opinion: A city attorney with prosecutorial functions may not represent a criminal
defense client in any jurisdiction. A city
attorney with no prosecutorial functions,
who has been appointed as city attorney
pursuant to statute, may not represent a
criminal defense client in that city, but
may represent a criminal defense client in
other jurisdictions, provided that Rule
1.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct is satisfied. An attorney with no
prosecutorial functions, who is retained by
a city on a contract or retainer basis, may
represent a criminal defense client in any
jurisdiction, provided that Rule 1.7(a) is
satisfied. An attorney who is a partner or
associate of a city attorney may not represent
a criminal defense client in any situation
where the city attorney is so prohibited.
Opinion No. 138
Approved January 27,1994
Issue: May a currently practicing sole
practitioner who formerly had associates
or junior partners continue to use the firm
name that includes the sole practitioner's
name followed by "& Associates'*?
Opinion: A lawyer may not use **& Associates'9 as part of a firm name where no
attorney associates are currently employed
by that firm.
Opinion No. 139
Approved January 27,1994
Issue: May a law firm's nonlawyer office
administrator be compensated solely on

Mmkim

ANNOUNCEMENT:
Recruiting Ethics Advisory Committee Members
The Utah State Bar is now accepting
applications for membership on the Ethics
Advisory Opinion Committee for terms
beginning July 1,1994.
In response to the increasing importance
and frequency of occurrence of ethical
issues that affect Utah lawyers, the Board of
Bar Commissioners has modified the procedure for constituting the Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee. Beginning July 1,
1994, the Committee will comprise the
Chair and 12 members, who will be
appointed upon application to the Bar. Regular appointments will be for three years,
although some appointments will be initially for one and two years to provide for
staggered terms.
The Committee is charged with preparing written opinions concerning the ethical
propriety of anticipated professional or personal conduct, when requested to do so by
the Utah State Bar, and forwarding these
opinions to the Board of Bar Commissioners for their consideration.
Because the written opinions of the
Committee have major and enduring significance to the Bar and the general public, the
Board wishes to solicit the participation of
lawyers (including the judiciary) who can
make a significant commitment to the goals
of the Committee and the Bar.
If you are interested in serving on the Ethics
Advisory Opinion Committee, please submit
an application with the following information, either in resume or narrative form:
• Basic information, such as years and
location of practice, type of practice (large

firm, solo, corporate, government, etc.),
and substantive areas of practice.
• A brief description of your interest in
the Committee, including relevant experience, interest in or ability to contribute to
well-written, well-researched opinions.
This should be a statement in the nature of
what you can contribute to the Committee.
Appointments will be made by a panel
comprising the Bar President, the Liaison
Commissioner for the Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee and the Chairman of
the Committee for the ensuing year. The
panel's selections are intended to accomplish two general goals:
• Appointment of members who are willing to dedicate the effort necessary to
cany out the responsibilities of the Committee and who are committed to the
issuance of timely, well-reasoned, articulate opinions.
• Creation of a balanced Committee that
incorporates as many diverse views and
backgrounds as possible. The selection
panel will attempt to create a Committee
with balance in: substantive practice areas,
type of practice (small firm, government,
etc.), geographical location, and experience.
If you would like to contribute to this
important function of the Bar, please submit a letter indicating your interest to:

the basis of a percentage of the gross
income of the firm?

NOTICE

Opinion: Under Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4(a)(3), a lawyer or law firm may
include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, which may be
based upon a percentage of die net or gross
income of the firm, so long as compensation
is not tied to receipt of particular fees. The
nonlawyer*s employment, however, must
still comport with Rule 5.4(d), which prevents the nonlawyer from owning an
interest in or controlling the activities of a
law practice.

The 12th Annual State and
Local Government Conference,
sponsored by the Government
and Politics Legal Society of the
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
will be held at the Provo Park
Hotel on Friday, March 18,1994.

Ethics Advisory Opinion
Committee Selection Panel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Any questions should be
directed to Alex Maynex at
378-3593.
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